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1 Introduction
1.1 Preferences and Business Cycles
From Keynes(1936) we know that behavior of consumer may be an important
factor of business cycles. Prosperity is always associated with consumer boom
and even today one of the element of the stimulation package were tax cuts,
which assumed to increase consumption and, consequently, output. Gottfried
Haberler in his book Prosperity and Depression points that business cycles are
caused by sudden changes in behavior of households.
New generation of macroeconomic models brought by Kydland and Prescott(1982)
couldn’t consider behavioral shocks as a source of business cycle by very sim-
ple reason: in the labor market household preferences determine labor supply
and firms provide market with labor demand, but change in labor supply gen-
erate negative comovement between wages and consumption on the one side,
and employment on the other side. Beaudry and Portier give proof of the im-
possibility of Pigou cycles in standard one-sector models, using King, Plosser
and Rebelo(1988) first order condition for labor supply. Partially this problem
was fixed by introducing different sectors of the economy. Partially increasing
number of decrease of freedom using adjustment cost to investment, capital and
labor might also be helpful
This paper takes different approach. To keep things as simple as possible
no adjustment costs and single-sector economy are assumed. Motivation for it
comes from attacking Barro-King challenge, that the real wage multiplied by
marginal utility of consumption is equal to marginal utility of leisure. This
restriction is the one that causes consumption and employment to have positive
comovement only in case of real wage increase. This restriction comes only from
the labor supply side, thus we can hope that modification of this condition will
give us necessary comovement. However, if single agent optimizing consumer is
considered, then we are back to Beaudry and Portier(2004) impossibility proof.
One of the solution would be to consider non-optimizing or optimizing non-
rationally agent, in the way of Jaimovich and Rebelo (2007), another way is to
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consider different type of consumers and consider interactions between them.
In the end this is what happens in reality, which is slightly more complicated
because of intermediate institutions - like banks and mutual funds. In the
absence of transaction costs they would disappear and the only things we would
be left with are savers and borrowers.
Differentiation between different types of agents brings its own problems for
expectation shocks. In the framework of rational expectation model everyone
possess equal amount of information and this limits number of possible shocks.
For example, it is important to notice that savers and borrowers often have
asymmetric information position. Borrower needs money now and cares only
about his debt and his ability to repay it. At the same time saver usually gives
money to several different borrowers and cares more about general conditions
of the economy.
First I will outline main equations of RBC model with savers and borrowers,
then I will show that in this the model with only two types of agents improve-
ment in confidence of investors will not generate positive comovement between
consumption and employment. Then I will demonstrate a model with two type
of borrowers and show that it has very nice properties. Model is very robust to
variation of preference parameters of the households.
2 Model for two types of agents
2.1 Consumers
Consumer problem for savers is the following
maxE0
∑
βt(
c1−ρ1st
1− ρ1 −
nφ1+1st
φ1 + 1
) (1)
ct + cst = Wtnst + (1− δ)Kt−1 +RktKt−1 − st +Rt−1st−1; (2)
By the same optimization problem for borrowers is:
maxE0(
∑
βt
c1−ρ2bt
1− ρ2 −
nφ2+1st
φ2 + 1
) (3)
cbt = Wtnbt + bt −Rt−1bt−1 +At; (4)
Notice, compare to standard model budget constraint of borrowers has ad-
ditional source of income At. It is a transfer that expected to be positive in the
future. It is supposed to model confidence of savers, so that borrowers would
clearly repay in the future and can borrow more. Equation for is the following
At = t−10, where t = ρt−1 + vt, where vt is random noise.
Rtbt ≤MWtnbt; (5)
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2.2 Firms
Firms maximize profits:
maxYt −WtLt −RktKt (6)
Output is equal
Yt = Kαt−1N
1−α
t +At (7)
Notice that in the output equation technology parameter is absent due to the
fact, that expectation about technology affect savers decision not only from the
position of creditors, but also from position of workers. The purpose of the
paper, however, is to show ”net effect” of the confidence.
2.3 Aggregation
Ct = cbt + cst (8)
Nt = nbt + nst (9)
2.4 Equilibrium. FOC.
2.4.1 Consumption
Euler equations:
1
cρ1st
= βE[
(Rkt + 1− δ)
cρ1st+1
] (10)
1
cρ1st
= βE[
Rt
cρ1st+1
] (11)
1
cρ1bt
= βE[cρ1bt+1Rt] + λRt (12)
2.4.2 Labor Supply
W
cρ1st
= nφ1st (13)
W
cρ2bt
= nφ2bt + λtMWt (14)
2.4.3 Firm FOC
Wt = (1− α) Yt
nbt + nst
(15)
Rkt = α
Yt
Kt−1
(16)
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2.4.4 Market Clearing
st = bt (17)
2.5 Simulation
In figures 1 and 2 we can observe that expected decrease in income of bor-
rowers causes decrease in consumption and increase in employment. This re-
sult confirms standard RBC one agent model prediction, where households feel
themselves poorer and decrease consumption and work more. In our two types
case borrowers decrease consumption a little and do not tend to increase labor
supply until the shock will hit, while savers behave as standard representative
agent - they increase labor hours and decrease consumption, feeling poorer. So
in aggregate we observe standard consequences of shift in labor supply.
Figure 1: Expected Decrease in Income of Borrowers after 10 Periods
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Figure 2: Expected Decrease in Income of Borrowers after 10 Periods
Therefore, consumer optimism and confidence cannot drive business cycle in
the absence of adjustment costs standard neoclassical framework.
3 Two Types of Borrowers
Let’s introduce additional type of borrower - cheater or bad borrower. Bad
borrower just does not return money. He borrows as much as possible. He
manages to borrow because savers doesn’t observe, whether the borrower is good
or not. In the model bad borrower is able to borrow in the next period, even if he
doesn’t return his current debt. Although this assumption is unrealistic, it can
have interpretation from the following point of view: in reality debts should be
repaid quite long time and many entrepreneurs are able to get additional credits
when they know that it is impossible to repay their current debts. Indirectly
this issue is described by given above assumption. Also it is important to notice
that general debtor doesn’t consider possibility of not repaying, and in the given
framework good borrowers do not believe that they might not repay. Indirectly
good borrowers are overoptimistic about their futures.
So optimization problem for the bad borrower is the following:
bbtRt = MnbbtWt (18)
where Rt is the interest rate, bbt - amount of debt, nbbt - labor supply of the bad
borrower, W - salary. He doesn’t have Euler equation, since borrowing doesn’t
imply reduction of future consumption. However, modified budget constraint is
still present.
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cbbt = Wtnbbt + bbt; (19)
putting that equations into utility function gives
maxE0
∑
βt(
c1−ρ1bbt
1− ρ1 −
nφ1+1bbt
φ1 + 1
) = maxE0
∑
βt(
(Wtnbbt + bbt)1−ρ1
1− ρ1 −
nφ1+1bbt
φ1 + 1
)
(20)
maxE0
∑
βt(
(Wtnbbt +MnbbtWt/Rt)1−ρ1
1− ρ1 −
nφ1+1bbt
φ1 + 1
) (21)
then labor supply for bad borrowers is given by
W (1 +M/Rt)
cρ1bbt
= nφ1bbt (22)
Existence of bad borrowers modifies Euler equation for savers:
1
cρ1st
= βEt[(1− Pt+1) Rt
cρ1st+1
] (23)
Aggregation constraints also have to take into account bad borrowers.
Ct = (1− Pt)cbt + Ptcbbt + cst (24)
Nt = (1− Pt)nbt + nst (25)
Pt = Pt−1 + ut (26)
All other equations remain the same as in the standard saver-borrower prob-
lem. In the figures 3,4, and 5 consequences of unexpected increase of percentage
of bad borrowers are shown. Output, capital and consumption are falling, while
employment is slightly increasing, but it is still below the steady state (this case
can be fixed by labor adjustment costs). Notice, that impulse response consider
just one period rise of the percentage of bad borrowers and Pt doesn’t follow
AR process, being a random walk.
These changes happen as savers suddenly reduce lending, therefore, increase
consumption. As a consequence investment began to fall, consumption is falling
because good borrowers are not able to borrow as much as before. Reducing
their consumption and debts they increase leisure, thus, labor supply is falling.
Small investment lead to lower level of capital and gradual decrease of output.
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Figure 3: Unexpected Increase in Percentage of The Bad Borrowers
Figure 4: Unexpected Increase in Percentage of The Bad Borrowers
7
Figure 5: Unexpected Increase in Percentage of The Bad Borrowers
4 Expected Appearance of Bad Borrowers
In figures 6,7, and 8 below increase in the percentage of borrowers after 10
periods is described. Once this information becomes available, recession in the
economy starts immediately. We observe decrease in employment, investment,
output and capital, while consumption is first smooth and the decreasing. This
fits well observed data.
Intuition is similar to actual increase of the bad borrowers. Savers increase
their consumption and reduce savings and thus, consumption of borrowers and
investment are falling. Borrowers consider consumption as more expensive and
move to leisure, thus, labor is falling. The major driver of decrease in output is
lower level of investment, which leads to decline in capital.
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Figure 6: Expected Increase in Percentage of The Bad Borrowers After 10
Periods
Figure 7: Expected Increase in Percentage of The Bad Borrowers After 10
Periods
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Figure 8: Expected Increase in Percentage of The Bad Borrowers After 10
Periods
5 Conclusion
This paper aimed at modelling business cycles after different demand shock
under standard RBC one-sector economy without adjustment costs and with
different type of consumers. This paper shows ways to overcome Barro-King
challenge in the framework of asymmetric information between debtors and
creditors, by showing that negative expectations about possibility of debtors
running with the money might cause recession in the economy. This result is
achieved through modelling ”overconfidence” of borrowers, who don’t increase
their labor supply in the presence of negative expectations. In the example
of just two types of consumers paper shows that labor supply increases and
consumption decreases, result equivalent to the standard RBC model and one
representative consumer.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Dynare Code for Bad Borrowers
var nbb cbb bb P K I c_s n_s C N W n_b c_b s Y LAMBDA R R_k b A ;
varexo u ;
parameters BETA_S, BETA_B, RHO, SIGMA, DEPR,BORCON, WEL1, WEL2,RHO1, RHO2, KAPS ;
KAPS = 0.33; // Elasticity of output with respect to capital
BETA_S = 0.99; // Discount factor for savers
BETA_B = 0.90 ; // Discount factor for borrowers
RHO = 0.90; // Autoregressive coefficient of technology innovation
SIGMA = 0.01;
DEPR = 0.02; // Rate of depreciation
RHO1 = .90;
RHO2 = .90;
BORCON =0.1; // Fraction of current income borrowers can borrow. Made small so that incetives of bad borrowers wouldn’t change a lot.
WEL1 = .20; // Elasticity of wages with respect to hours
WEL2 = .20;
model;
// SAVERS Budget constraint
exp(K)+ exp(c_s) = exp(W)*exp(n_s)+(1-DEPR)*exp(K(-1))+exp(R_k)*exp(K(-1))-exp(s)+
+(1-P)*exp(R(-1))*exp(s(-1));
// SAVERS Euler equation for capital
1/exp(c_s)^RHO1=(BETA_S/(exp(c_s(+1))^RHO1))*(exp(R_k)+1-DEPR);
// Labor Supply for savers
exp(W)/exp(c_s)^RHO1 = exp(n_s)^WEL1;
// Euler equation for lending
1/exp(C)^RHO1 = BETA_S*(1-P(+1))*exp(R)/exp(C(+1))^RHO1;
// Borrowing Constraints for Borrower
exp(R)*exp(b) = BORCON*exp(W)*exp(n_b);
// Labor supply for borrowers
exp(n_b)^WEL2= exp(W)/exp(c_b)^RHO2 + exp(LAMBDA)*BORCON*exp(W);
// Euler equation for borrowing
1/exp(c_b)^RHO2 = BETA_B*exp(R)/(exp(c_b(+1))^RHO2) + exp(LAMBDA)*exp(R);
// Budget constraints for borrowers.
exp(c_b) = exp(W)*exp(n_b) + exp(b)- exp(R(-1))*exp(b(-1));
// Borrowing Constrain for bad Borrower
exp(R)*exp(bb) = BORCON*exp(W)*exp(nbb);
12
// Labor supply for bad borrower
exp(nbb)^WEL2= exp(W)*(1+BORCON/exp(R))/exp(cbb)^RHO2;
// Budget constraing for bad borrower
exp(cbb) = exp(W)*exp(nbb) + exp(bb);
// Market clearing
(1-P)*exp(b)+P*exp(bb) = exp(s);
//exp(W) = (1-KAPS)*exp(A)*(exp(K(-1))^KAPS)*(exp(n_s) + exp(n_b))^(-KAPS);
//exp(R_k) = KAPS* exp(A)*(((exp(n_s) + exp(n_b))/exp(K(-1)))^(1-KAPS));
//PRODUCTION FUNCTION
exp(Y) = exp(K(-1))^KAPS*(exp(n_s)+(1-P)*exp(n_b)+P*exp(nbb))^(1-KAPS);
//CAPITAL ACCUMULATION
exp(I) = exp(K(+1))-(1-DEPR)*exp(K);
// Labor demand equation
exp(W) = (1-KAPS)*exp(Y)/(exp(N));
// INTEREST RATE
exp(R_k) = KAPS*exp(Y)/exp(K(-1));
// Aggregate Consumptiom
exp(C) = exp(c_s) + (1-P)*exp(c_b)+P*exp(cbb);
// Aggregate labor hours
exp(N) = exp(n_s) + (1-P)*exp(n_b)+P*exp(nbb);
A =A(-1) + u;
P=A(-10);
end;
initval;
Y = 0;
W = 0;
A = 0;
K = 0;
I = 0;
end;
steady;
shocks;
var u; stderr SIGMA ;
end;
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stoch_simul(periods=1000,order=1,irf=30) A c_s c_b C;
stoch_simul(periods=1000,order=1,irf=30) n_s n_b nbb cbb N Y;
stoch_simul(periods=1000,order=1,irf=30) R s K I;
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